The classic “Lockean” thesis about full and partial belief says full belief is rational iff strong partial belief is rational. Hannes Leitgeb’s “Humean” thesis proposes a subtler connection. $ \newcommand\p{Pr} \newcommand{\B}{\mathbf{B}} \newcommand{\given}{\mid} $ The Humean Thesis For a rational agent whose full beliefs are given by the set $\mathbf{B}$, and whose credences by the probability function $\p$: $B \in \mathbf{B}$ iff $\p(B \given A) > t$ for all $A$ consistent with $\mathbf{B}$.... Read more
If you look at the little network diagram below, you’ll probably agree that $P$ is the most “central” node in some intuitive sense. This post is about using a belief’s centrality in the web of belief to give a coherentist account of its justification. The more central a belief is, the more justified it is. But how do we quantify “centrality”? The rough idea: the more ways there are to arrive at a proposition by following inferential pathways in the web of belief, the more central it is.... Read more
Today The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology is available for download. It’s an open access book, the first published by PhilPapers itself. (The editors are Richard Pettigrew and me.) The book features 11 outstanding entries by 11 wonderful philosophers. “Precise Credences”, by Michael G. Titelbaum “Decision Theory”, by Johanna Thoma “Imprecise Probabilities”, by Anna Mahtani “Primitive Conditional Probabilities”, by Kenny Easwaran “Infinitesimal Probabilities”, by Sylvia Wenmackers “Comparative Probabilities”, by Jason Konek “Belief Revision Theory”, by Hanti Lin “Ranking Theory”, by Franz Huber “Full & Partial Belief”, by Konstantin Genin “Doxastic Logic”, by Michael Caie “Conditionals”, by R.... Read more
Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. Researching knowledge, probability, and decision-making. Indulging in programming and related nerdery.